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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
WILLS-EVIDENcE-RIGHT OF SUBSCRIBING WITNESS TO TES-
TIFY.-The will of the testatrix was admitted to probate over the
objection of her niece who was her only living relative. In previous
wills made by the testatrix the niece was left the income of the estate
for life. The same provision was made for her in this will, but the
residuary estate was bequeathed to the lawyer who drew the will. In
prior wills the residue was bequeathed to charity. The niece con-
tested this will on the ground of undue influence. The Appellate
Division affirmed the finding of the surrogate that there was no undue
influence, and the will was admitted to probat6.Y An appeal was
taken on the ground that certain testimony of a subscribing witness,
who was an employee of the lawyer who drew the will, should have
been excluded, and that questions calling for the state of the testa-
trix's feelings toward her lawyer after the making of the will should
not have been excluded. Held, affirmed. Matter of Putnam, 257
N. Y. 140, 177 N. E. 399 (1931).
The claim of the appellant that the testimony of the lawyer's
clerk related to confidential communications with the deceased and
therefore should have been excluded disregards sections 353 and 354
of the Civil Practice Act (N. Y.). By these sections it must be
presumed that the legislature intended the lawyer's clerk to share
the privilege of the attorney in testifying, in a probate proceeding,
where he has become a subscribing witness to a will.2
Evidence showed that the testatrix, on various occasions previous
to making the will, had expressed fear and distrust of her attorney.
Questions asked by the appellant's attorney regarding the state of her
feeling after the making of the will were excluded, and rightly so.
Such testimony is not entitled to any weight in proving external facts
such as fraud and undue influence, 3 though it is competent to show
the state of the testatrix's mind, her mental capacity, and her ability
to resist the lawyer's influence. 4 The evidence of testatrix's attitude
towards her lawyer who drew the will was freely given and evidence
showing the continuation of such feeling after the making of the will
would not have strengthened the case of the appellant. "The under-
lying fact is that, so far as the contestant herself is concerned, she
has received the bounty which the testatrix always had in mind
to give her." 5
'In re Putnam's Will, 231 App. Div. 707, 245 N. Y. Supp. 777 (lst Dept.
1930).
'Under §353 attorneys and their employees are forbidden to disclose a
communication made to them by clients. Section 354 abrogates the above
section where the attorney is a subscribing witness to a will. The word
"employees" is missing from this section, but it is assumed that the clerk shares
the privilege as well as the attorney. (1924) 2 N. Y. L. REv. 13, see also (1930)
4 ST. JOEaN'S L. REv. 330.
'Smith v. Keller, 205 N. Y. 39, 98 N. E. 214 (1912); Matter of Levy's
Will, 198 App. Div. 773, 191 N. Y. Supp. 95 (1st Dept. 1921).
Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y. 357, 374 (1882).
' Instant case at 146, 177 N. E. at 402.
RECENT DECISIONS
A bequest to the lawyer who draws the will is most often viewed
with suspicion, and the courts require the lawyer to explain the cir-
cumstances and to show that the gift was freely and willingly made.0
Slight circumstances indicating a testator's susceptibility to attorney-
beneficiary's influence would support a finding of undue influence
over the testatrix. 7 The burden of coming forward with evidence in
these cases is always on the attorney to show that the will expressed
the free, untrammeled wishes of the testatrix s In the absence of any
explanation a jury may be justified in drawing the inference of undue
influence. 9
R. C. W.
WILLS-BEQUEST TO UNBORN GRANDCHILDRN.-The decedent,
after bequeathing two thousand dollars to two specifically named
grandchildren, further bequeathed a like sum to each of her "grand-
children who may be born after the making of this will and who may
still be living at my death." About seven and one-half months after
the death of the testatrix, a granddaughter was born. This action
was brought to enforce the infant's right to one of these legacies.
Held, the granddaughter was "born" and "living" within the meaning
of the will and so was entitled to receive one of the legacies. Matter
of Gebhardt, 139 Misc. 775, 249 N. Y. Supp. 286 (Kings Co. 1931).
Cases in point over a considerable period of time have not limited
the word "born" to the strict construction of "delivered" but have
held that for the purpose of taking under a devise a child en ventre
sa mere is deemed born and alive.' The child is regarded as a legal
entity in many respects. It may sue to recover for the wrongful
death of its parent due to the culpable negligence of another. 2 Black-
stone says that at no matter how early a stage it may have a guardian
appointed, it may take under a marriage settlement; it may have an
C Matter of Smith, 95 N. Y. 516 (1884).
Tarr v. Tucker, - Mass. -, 172 N. E. 257 (1930).8 Supra note 4, at 371, "Such wills, when made to the exclusion of the
natural objects of the testator's bounty, are viewed with great suspicion by the
law, and some proof should be required beside the factum of the will before
the vill can be sustained."
"Matter of Kindberg's Will, 207 N. Y. 220, 228, 100 N. E. 789, 791 (1912).
Heurtt v. Grum, 77 N. J. Eq. 345, 77 Atl. 25 (1910) ; Quinlen v. Welch,
69 Hun 584 23 N. Y. Supp. 963 (5th Dept. 1893); Cooper v. Heatherstone, 65
App. Div. 961, 73 N. Y. Supp. 14 (2d Dept. 1901) ; Matter of Farmers Loan
and Trust Co., 82 Misc. 330, 143 N. Y. Supp. 700 (1913) ; Matter of Voight,
178 App. Div. 751, 764 N. Y. Supp. 1117 (2d Dept. 1918) ; Matter of McEwan,
202 App. Div. 50, 195 N. Y. Supp. 460 (3d Dept. 1922) ; Matter of Wells, 129
Misc. 447, 221 N. Y. Supp. 714 (1927) ; (1908) 21 HAaV. L. Rav. 360; (1927)
12 ST. Louis L. REy. 85.
2 Quinlen v. Welch, supra note 1.
